



PacSec 2008 Conference

Inside "Winnyp" - Winnyp Internals and Concepts of Network Crawling

Fourteenforty Research Institute, Inc.

<http://www.fourteenforty.jp>

Senior Software Engineer

Toshiaki Ishiyama



Summary

- Winnyp is an anonymous P2P filesharing software based on Winny.
- Winnyp is compatible with Winny, it can communicate with Winny.
- Encryption key generation algorithm of Winnyp is more difficult than Winny .
- The report of having analyzed Winnyp has not gone up up to now.
- I report on the analytical result of the cryptographic algorithm of Winnyp and the outline of crawling system (WinnypRadar).



Agenda

1. Internal Winnyp.
2. The approaches to the statical analysis for anonymous P2P filesharing systems.
3. WinnypRadar – Winnyp network crawler-



```
int packet_analysis(GDDCONFIG *gddc, unsigned char *packet, unsigned long length)
```


```
struct ip      *ip_header; /* IP header */
struct tcphdr *tcp_header; /* TCP header */
char          *tcp_data; /* TCP data */
struct in_addr addr; /* IP address */
char          sourceIP[16]; /* Source IP address */
char          destIP[16]; /* Destination IP address */
unsigned short sourcePort; /* Source Port */
unsigned short destPort; /* Destination Port */
unsigned long  len_data; /* Length of data part */
unsigned long  iph_len; /* Length of IP header */
unsigned long  tcp_len; /* Length of TCP header */
unsigned long  sequence; /* Expected sequence */
port_index; /* Index number of port list */
dir;
log;
CONN_LIST
static char datestr[512]; /* Buffer to store datetime */
time_t timeval;
struct tm *timep=NULL;
char *timesp=NULL;
char *c;
```

```
/* Get pointer of IP header and check length of IP */
if (length-SIZE_OF_ETHHDR < MINSIZE_IP+MINSIZE_TCP) return(0);
ip_header = (struct ip *) (packet+SIZE_OF_ETHHDR);
if (ip_header->ip_v!=4) return(0);
iph_len = ((unsigned long) (ip_header->ip_hl))*4;
if (iph_len<MINSIZE_IP) return(0);
if ((unsigned long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len) < MINSIZE_IP+MINSIZE_TCP)
return(0);
if ((unsigned long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len) > length-SIZE_OF_ETHHDR) {
return(0);
}
```

```
/* Get pointer of TCP header and check length of TCP */
tcp_header = (struct tcphdr *) ((char *) ip_header+iph_len);
tcp_len = ((unsigned long) (tcp_header->th_off))*4;
tcp_data = (char *) tcp_header+tcp_len;
if (tcp_len<MINSIZE_TCP) return(0);
```

```
/* Get other parameter in TCP/IP header */
if (((long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len)-(long)iph_len-(long)tcp_len)<0)
return(0);
len_data = ((unsigned long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len)
-iph_len-tcp_len);
sourcePort = ntohs(tcp_header->th_sport);
destPort = ntohs(tcp_header->th_dport);
memcpy(&addr, &(ip_header->ip_src), sizeof(struct in_addr));
strcpy(sourceIP, (char *) inet_ntoa(addr));
memcpy(&addr, &(ip_header->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
strcpy(destIP, (char *) inet_ntoa(addr));
if (!strcmp(sourceIP, destIP)) return(0);
```


1. Internal Winnyp



```
00001B70 FF 15 F0 11 00 01 E9 0C 03 00 00 E8 70 1C 00 00
00001B80 33 F6 56 E8 81 FC FF FF 85 00 0F 84 87 03 00 00 3 * 離... +
00001B90 56 6A 02 FF 35 6C 80 00 01 FF 35 D0 87 00 01 FF Vj . 51... 5E...
00001BA0 15 CC 11 00 01 85 00 75 10 68 10 10 00 00 FF 35 . 7... * u. h... 5
00001BB0 50 80 00 01 FF 35 44 80 00 01 FF 35 D0 87 00 01 P... 5D... 5E...
00001BC0 FF 15 04 12 00 01 FF 35 D0 87 00 01 FF 15 20 12
00001BD0 00 01 FF 35 D4 88 00 01 FF 15 58 10 00 01 E9 64
00001BE0 03 00 00 83 FE 1A 77 47 0F 84 59 03 00 00 83 FE
00001BF0 11 0F 85 16 01 00 00 33 F6 39 35 E8 87 00 01 74
00001C00 22 88 3D 28 12 00 01 56 FF D7 56 FF D7 68 00 10
00001C10 00 00 FF 35 50 80 00 01 FF 35 88 80 00 01 E9 7D
00001C20 02 00 00 6A 01 E8 0F FC FF FF E9 1A 03 00 00 88
00001C30 7D 14 88 11 01 00 00 3B F0 0F 87 88 00 00 00 3B
00001C40 F0 0F 84 16 02 00 00 83 FE 1C 0F 85 8D 00 00 00
00001C50 33 F6 39 75 10 74 2F A1 EC 87 00 01 88 0D F0 87
00001C60 00 01 38 06 75 08 38 CE 0F 84 D9 02 00 00 8B 3D
00001C70 14 12 00 01 51 50 68 81 00 00 00 FF 35 D4 87 00
00001C80 01 E9 56 01 00 00 88 3D 14 12 00 01 68 F0 87 00
00001C90 01 68 EC 87 00 01 68 80 00 00 00 FF 35 D4 87 00
00001CA0 01 FF D7 A1 EC 87 00 01 88 0D F0 87 00 01 38 01
00001CB0 75 11 89 35 EC 87 00 01 89 35 F0 87 00 01 E9 84
00001CC0 02 00 00 51 50 68 81 01 00 00 88 CE 88 12 01 00
00001CD0 00 2B C8 0F 84 3C 02 00 00 83 E9 04 0F 84 29 02
00001CE0 00 00 49 0F 84 F9 01 00 00 81 E9 1C 01 00 0F
00001CF0 84 E0 01 00 00 81 E9 E6 00 00 0F 84 3D 01 00
00001D00 00 81 E9 E8 7C 00 00 0F 84 02 01 00 00 3B 35 5C
00001D10 88 00 01 0F 85 EE 00 00 00 88 45 14 88 48 0C 88
00001D20 C1 8B 01 F7 0D C1 EA 02 83 E0 01 83 E2 01 F6 C1
```


Outline of Winnyp

- Winnyp is an anonymous P2P filesharing software based on Winny.
- Winnyp is compatible with Winny. It communicates with Winny protocol. But Winnyp uses original algorithm in encryption key generation process.





Outline of Winnyp

- Winnyp lets the executable file of Winny read winnyp.dll.
- Modified file calls the init function of winnyp.dll.




The screenshot shows a dependency viewer window. The left pane displays a tree view of dependencies for WINNYP.EXE, including ADVAPI32.DLL, KERNEL32.DLL, VERSION.DLL, WSOCK32.DLL, WINSPOOL.DRV, COMCTL32.DLL, COMDLG32.DLL, GDI32.DLL, SHELL32.DLL, USER32.DLL, OLEAUT32.DLL, and WINNYP.DLL. The right pane shows the details for the selected dependency, WINNYP.DLL.

PI	Ordinal ^	Hint	Function	Entry Point
	N/A	0 (0x0000)	init	Not Bound

E	Ordinal ^	Hint	Function	Entry Point
	1 (0x0001)	0 (0x0000)	init	0x00003660

Outline of Winnyp

- Rewrite instruction for calling init function






Initialization of Winnyp

- Read configuraton file for Winnyp. (disper.ini)
- Create parameter for generating encryption key
- Create parameter for sending packet
- Patching Winnyp.exe

Initialization of Winnyp



- In the patch processing to Winnyp.exe, the rewriting processing in about 200 places is executed.
- The majority of the rewriting processing are changes in the referred character string. ex) Noderef.txt > Nodreffp.txt






Encryption key generation algorithm

- In Winny, we could analyze the cryptographic algorithm easily. Because it's easy.
- In Winnyp, the cryptographic algorithm is RC4. However, the encryption key generation algorithm combines two or more algorithms, and the analysis is difficult.




Encryption key generation algorithm – Outline –




- Winnyp's main routine for generating encryption key
- Very complex, very long

Encryption key generation algorithm – Outline –




- The flow which divided by the processing block.
- More complex than Winny.






Encryption key generation algorithm – Stage 1 –






Encryption key generation algorithm – Stage 2 –



Encryption key generation algorithm – Stage 3 –





Sending packet

- In winnyp's packet sending process, add dummy data after winny packet.
- Encryption key generation algorithm is chosen by Winnyp configuration file. (for Winny or Winnyp)
- Dummy data are added when kind of packet is connection establishing or connection closing.






Sending packet

- Initial packet with dummy bytes

0030	fd b8 92 44 00 00 f7 90 ea b4 a4 17 4e b6 6a 12	...D... ..N,j.
0040	34 7e eb 1f 35 70 38 cd e8 74 d6 4b 48 22 13 37	4~..5p8. .t.KH".7
0050	8b 5a 2c 8a 3a 06 08 6c 4a 89 8a 81 3b 7e 9a 44	.Z,..:..l J...;~.D
0060	74 c2 65 a6 6f 31 50 f9 24 81 ef 58 29 ff c6 be	t.e.o1P. \$.X)...
0070	5e 92 ba 8f 13 cc df 86 95 9c 8d fa 19 df 93 f7	^..... ..
0080	35 1d 7d 67 ee f3 02 49 0a bf 25 a2 78 6a 7d 4f	5.}g...I ...%.xj}o
0090	20 0f 78 36 47 af 64 a9 e2 de fc 90 7d e1 37 6e	.x6G.d.}.7n
00a0	3b 42 20 59 24 67 bf 21 d9 e8 26 e6 ad b0 96 93	;B Y\$g.! ..&.....
00b0	08 1e ca cd cf 08 21 28 09 5e ac e6 4d 60 6b 1c!(^..M`k.
00c0	c2 78 e1 e2 bc 95 32 1c 02 3c b5 01 ee 1d b8 8a	.x....2. <.....
00d0	b5 07 fb 3f 93 c4 3c 79 0b c2 a7 56 94 a6 9d 51	...?...<y ...V...Q
00e0	c4 8b a3 f8 f6 44 a8 14 14 df 12 54 ac 47 24 99D... ..T.G\$.
00f0	0a e1 3e f7 4d b8 cb 0b ae 00 09 18 db 25 3b c2	...>.M... ..%:.
0100	5c 4d de 6b d0 01 00 3f 3e 6d 0d 51 89 2a c0 c2	\M.k...? >m.Q.*..
0110	13 44 4d 36 73 f9 a4 45 68 bf ad 42 04 42 51 97	.DM6s..E h..B.BQ.
0120	cd 11 8a 84 6b 2b 43 39 76 a8 e0 3d e1 3a 67 00k+C9 v...=:g.
0130	59 39 35 ed 88 84 e1 ec 2a 18 9b f4 38 a7 b4 31	Y95..... *.8..1
0140	5d 98 30 35 a3 fb 90 b7 12 77 75 93 f6 20 8e 6f] .05.... .wu... o
0150	96 97 79 14 f4 a9 df 09 f1 f5 66 77 f4 15 55 6c	..y..... ..fw..u
0160	26 e3 b3 12 b0 33 43 0a 10 b0 22 8f b9 ba 2c 26	&....3C. .."....&
0170	f2 4e 42 aa 38 95 49 07 f3 d6 72 f8 db e3 5c b4	.NB.8.I. ..r....\.
0180	f1 98 73 fc c6 ea cf 61 ec 33 7d 31 69 85 2f ac	..s....a .3}1i./.
0190	50 6f 27 ec 3a 36 10 b8 bb 95 fa e6 ea 80 c8 6b	Po'.:6.k
01a0	f6 51 24 9f a7 f6 65 06 6b 61 14 84 3a 25 9b ec	.Q\$...e. ka...%..
01b0	8f 30 4f f1 d3 5e a1 4b cd ac a0 cc af c3 90 49	.00..^,KI
01c0	e3 24 86 07 02 1d 36 e7 cb 8c dd 8a ee a0 a9 9b	.\$....6.
01d0	8f 06 24 17 b3 ea b0 66 f1 39 0f b2 6c 30 85 0a	..\$....f .9..70..
01e0	99 d8 80 bd 4f bd 92 eb cb ee 5e a5 93 f5 67 04O... ..^....g.
01f0	0a 89 b3 c1 e7 5f 04 23 5c b1 8d aa db 02 25 45_# \.....%E
0200	f6 34 a2 e9 4d a5 bf 69 af 30 8d e9 89 27 9d e6	.4..M..i .0...'. ..
0210	a1 03 ab b9 74 3b 8d 6e ba 08 9c 77 3a d1 3d d9	...t;:n ...w:=.

Receiving packet

- Winnyp creates three encryption keys when initialization packet received. (Winny v2.0b7.1, Winnyp v2.1b7.27, Winnyp v2.1b7.28)
- Specifies the version of connected node by using each keys.
- Winnyp can communicate with multiple version by these feature.





Specifying target node

- Decrypt the first 5 bytes.
- Some checks are done to decrypted 5 bytes.

Check #1	Length is greater than 0
Check #2	Length is less than 131,072
Check #3	Length plus 4 is less than the receiving packet length
Check #4	Command number is less than 100

- If all checks was succeeded, the version of connected node was specified.
- If check was failed, checks are done again with other encryption key.



```
int packet_analysis(GDDCONFIG *gddc, unsigned char *packet, unsigned long length)
```


```
struct ip      *ip_header; /* IP header */
struct tcphdr *tcp_header; /* TCP header */
char          *tcp_data; /* TCP data */
struct in_addr addr; /* IP address */
char          sourceIP[16]; /* Source IP address */
char          destIP[16]; /* Destination IP address */
short        sourcePort; /* Source Port */
short        destPort; /* Destination Port */
unsigned short len_data; /* Length of data */
unsigned long iph_len; /* Length of IP header */
unsigned long toph_len; /* Length of TCP header */
unsigned long sequence; /* Expected sequence */
int          portindex; /* Index number of port list */
int          dir; /* Direction */
unsigned char conn_list; /* Connection list */
CONN_LIST *t; /* Temporary connection list */
static char datestr[512]; /* Buffer to store datetime */
time_t      time_t;
struct tm   time_tm;
char        *time_str;
char        *c;
```

```
/* Get pointer of IP header and check length of IP */
if (length-SIZE_OF_ETHHDR < MINSIZE_IP+MINSIZE_TCP) return(0);
ip_header = (struct ip *) (packet+SIZE_OF_ETHHDR);
if (ip_header->ip_p!=IPPROTO_TCP)
|| ip_header->ip_v!=4) return(0);
iph_len = ((unsigned long) (ip_header->ip_hl))*4;
if (iph_len<MINSIZE_IP) return(0);
if ((unsigned long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len) < MINSIZE_IP+MINSIZE_TCP)
return(0);
if ((unsigned long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len) > length-SIZE_OF_ETHHDR) {
return(0);
}
```

```
/* Get pointer of TCP header and check length of TCP */
tcp_header = (struct tcphdr *) ((char *) ip_header+iph_len);
tph_len = ((unsigned long) (tcp_header->th_off))*4;
tcp_data = (char *) tcp_header+tph_len;
if (tph_len<MINSIZE_TCP) return(0);
```

```
/* Get other parameter in TCP/IP header */
if (((long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len)-(long)iph_len-(long)tph_len)<0)
return(0);
len_data = ((unsigned long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len)
-iph_len-tph_len);
sourcePort = ntohs(tcp_header->th_sport);
destPort = ntohs(tcp_header->th_dport);
memcpy(&addr, &(ip_header->ip_src), sizeof(struct in_addr));
strcpy(sourceIP, (char *) inet_ntoa(addr));
memcpy(&addr, &(ip_header->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
strcpy(destIP, (char *) inet_ntoa(addr));
if (!strcmp(sourceIP, destIP)) return(0);
```


2. The approaches to the statical analysis for anonymous P2P filesharing systems



00001B70	FF 15 F0 11 00 01 E9 0C 03 00 00 E8 70 1C 00 00	...
00001B80	33 F6 56 E8 81 FC FF FF 85 00 0F 84 87 03 00 00	3 * 離 ... 1 ...
00001B90	56 6A 02 FF 35 6C 80 00 01 FF 35 D0 87 00 01 FF	Vj . 51 ... 5E ...
00001BA0	15 CC 11 00 01 85 00 75 10 68 10 10 00 00 FF 35	. 7 ... u . h ... 5
00001BB0	50 80 00 01 FF 35 44 80 00 01 FF 35 D0 87 00 01	P ... 5D ... 5E ...
00001B80	FF 15 04 12 00 01 FF 35 D0 87 00 01 FF 15 20 12	...
00001BD0	00 01 FF 35 D4 88 00 01 FF 15 58 10 00 01 E9 64	5P ... X ... 離
00001BE0	03 00 00 83 FE 1A 77 47 0F 84 59 03 00 00 83 FE	w . 山 ...
00001BF0	11 0F 85 16 01 00 00 33 F6 39 35 E8 87 00 01 74	... 3.95 ... t
00001C00	22 88 3D 28 12 00 01 56 FF D7 56 FF D7 68 00 10	... V . 7V . 5h ...
00001C10	00 00 FF 35 50 80 00 01 FF 35 88 80 00 01 E9 7D	5P ... 5 ... 書
00001C20	02 00 00 6A 01 E8 0F FC FF FF E9 1A 03 00 00 88	... 急
00001C30	7D 14 88 11 01 00 00 3B F0 0F 87 88 00 00 00 3B	... 離 ...
00001C40	F0 0F 84 16 02 00 00 83 FE 1C 0F 85 8D 00 00 00	... *
00001C50	33 F6 39 75 10 74 2F A1 EC 87 00 01 88 0D F0 87	3.9u . t / ... *
00001C60	00 01 38 06 75 08 38 CE 0F 84 D9 02 00 00 8B 3D	... 離 ...
00001C70	14 12 00 01 51 50 68 81 00 00 00 FF 35 D4 87 00	... QPh7 ... 5P ...
00001C80	01 E9 56 01 00 00 88 3D 14 12 00 01 68 F0 87 00	... 離 ... h ...
00001C90	01 68 EC 87 00 01 68 80 00 00 00 FF 35 D4 87 00	... h ... h ... 5P ...
00001CA0	01 FF D7 A1 EC 87 00 01 88 0D F0 87 00 01 38 C1	... 5 . 2 ... * ... 5P ...
00001CB0	75 11 89 35 EC 87 00 01 89 35 F0 87 00 01 E9 84	u . 5 ... 5 * ... 離
00001CC0	02 00 00 51 50 E9 07 01 00 00 88 CE 88 12 01 00	... QP ... 動 ...
00001CD0	00 2B 08 0F 84 3C 02 00 00 83 E9 04 0F 84 29 02	... 3 . < ... (...) ...
00001CE0	00 00 49 0F 84 F9 01 00 00 81 E9 1C 01 00 00 0F	... 1 *
00001CF0	84 E0 01 00 00 81 E9 E6 00 00 00 0F 84 3D 01 00	... * ...
00001D00	00 81 E9 E8 7C 00 00 0F 84 02 01 00 00 3B 35 5C	... * 離 ... 5P ...
00001D10	88 00 01 0F 85 EE 00 00 00 88 45 14 88 48 0C 88	... 離 離 ... 5P ...
00001D20	C1 8B 01 F7 0D C1 EA 02 83 E0 01 83 E2 01 F6 C1	... 離 * 子 ... * ... *

Building analytical environment

- When the P2P application is connected with a usual network, there are a lot of connections, and the analysis is difficult.
- Therefore, the environment that can be communicated by one-on-one is necessary.





Anti debugging, packing

- To improve the anonymity of the P2P software, Anti debugging and packing are given.
- To evade these, it doesn't start by the debugger but it is made to attach by the debugger after the P2P application starts.
- Even if the analysis of initialization flies to some degree, the analysis by this method is possible because it is unquestionable when communication processing is analyzed.



Analysing network process

- Because the execution file cannot be read with IDA Pro, it is difficult to specify communication processing.
- The location where communication processing is done is specified by setting the breakpoint to API, and tracing the stack.
- Specific in the file access part etc. is also possible by a similar method

Guessing encryption algorithm

- Even if the assembly code of the cryptographic algorithm is analyzed, specific of the algorithm is difficult.
- Code Search Engine can be used to guess the cryptographic algorithm.

```

arg_0      = dword ptr 4
mov       eax, [esp+arg_0]
xor       ecx, ecx
mov       dword ptr [eax], 67452301h
mov       dword ptr [eax+4], 0EFCDA889h
mov       dword ptr [eax+8], 98BADCFEh
mov       dword ptr [eax+0Ch], 10325478h
  
```



Google Labs
ソースコード検索オプション

検索

ソースコード

同一の結果 11 件

```

206: /* SHA1 initialization constants */
context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
context->state[1] = 0xEFCDA889;
context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
  
```

をさらに

同一の結果 4 件

```

231: {
    this->state[0] = 0x67452301;
    this->state[1] = 0xEFCDA889;
    this->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
  
```




```
int packet_analysis(GDDCONFIG *gddc, unsigned char *packet, unsigned long length)
```


```
struct ip      *ip_header; /* IP header */
struct tcphdr *tcp_header; /* TCP header */
char          *tcp_data; /* TCP data */
struct in_addr addr; /* IP address */
char          sourceIP[16]; /* Source IP address */
char          destIP[16]; /* Destination IP address */
unsigned short sourcePort; /* Source Port */
unsigned short destPort; /* Destination Port */
unsigned long  len; /* Length of data part */
int           ip_ttl; /* IP TTL */
unsigned long  top; /* Top of IP header */
unsigned long  seq; /* Sequence number */
int           portIndex; /* Index of port list */
int           direction; /* Packet direction */
int           logtype; /* Log type */
CONN_LIST     *tbl, *tbl; /* Connection table list */
static char   destIP[16]; /* Off-Host IP address */
time_t        timeval;
struct tm     *timep=NULL;
char          *timesp=NULL;
char          *c;
```

```
/* Get pointer of IP header and check length of IP */
if (length-SIZE_OF_ETHHDR < MINSIZE_IP+MINSIZE_TCP) return(0);
ip_header = (struct ip *) (packet+SIZE_OF_ETHHDR);
if (ip_header->ip_p!=IPPROTO_TCP)
    || ip_header->ip_v!=4) return(0);
iph_len = ((unsigned long) (ip_header->ip_hl))*4;
if (iph_len<MINSIZE_IP) return(0);
if ((unsigned long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len) < MINSIZE_IP+MINSIZE_TCP)
    return(0);
if ((unsigned long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len) > length-SIZE_OF_ETHHDR) {
    return(0);
}
```

```
/* Get pointer of TCP header and check length of TCP */
tcp_header = (struct tcphdr *) ((char *) ip_header+iph_len);
tcp_len = ((unsigned long) (tcp_header->th_off))*4;
tcp_data = (char *) tcp_header+tcp_len;
if (tcp_len<MINSIZE_TCP) return(0);
```

```
/* Get other parameter in TCP/IP header */
if (((long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len)-(long)iph_len-(long)tcp_len)<0)
    return(0);
len_data = ((unsigned long)ntohs(ip_header->ip_len)
            -iph_len-tcp_len);
sourcePort = ntohs(tcp_header->th_sport);
destPort = ntohs(tcp_header->th_dport);
memcpy(&addr, &(ip_header->ip_src), sizeof(struct in_addr));
strcpy(sourceIP, (char *) inet_ntoa(addr));
memcpy(&addr, &(ip_header->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
strcpy(destIP, (char *) inet_ntoa(addr));
if (!strcmp(sourceIP, destIP)) return(0);
```




3. WinnypRadar - Crawling Winnyp network-



00001B70	FF 15 F0 11 00 01 E9 0C 03 00 00 E8 70 1C 00 00	...
00001B80	33 F6 56 E8 81 FC FF FF 85 00 0F 84 87 03 00 00	3 * 離 ... 4 ...
00001B90	56 6A 02 FF 35 6C 80 00 01 FF 35 D0 87 00 01 FF	Vj . 51 ... 5E ...
00001BA0	15 CC 11 00 01 85 00 75 10 68 10 10 00 00 FF 35	. 7 ... u . h ... 5
00001BB0	50 80 00 01 FF 35 44 80 00 01 FF 35 D0 87 00 01	P ... 5D ... 5E ...
00001BC0	FF 15 04 12 00 01 FF 35 D0 87 00 01 FF 15 20 12	... 5E ...
00001BD0	00 01 FF 35 D4 88 00 01 FF 15 58 10 00 01 E9 64	... 5F ... X ... 離
00001BE0	03 00 00 83 FE 1A 77 47 0F 84 59 03 00 00 83 FE	... wG . 山 ...
00001BF0	11 0F 85 16 01 00 00 33 F6 39 35 E8 87 00 01 74	... 3. 95 離 ... t
00001C00	22 88 3D 28 12 00 01 56 FF D7 56 FF D7 68 00 10	... = (. V . 7V . 5h ...
00001C10	00 00 FF 35 50 80 00 01 FF 35 88 80 00 01 E9 7D	... 5P ... 5 * ... 離
00001C20	02 00 00 6A 01 E8 0F FC FF FF E9 1A 03 00 00 88	... j ... 急
00001C30	70 14 88 11 01 00 00 3B F0 0F 87 88 00 00 00 3B	... 9 ... 離
00001C40	F0 0F 84 16 02 00 00 83 FE 1C 0F 85 8D 00 00 00	... 3. 9u . t / ... *
00001C50	33 F6 39 75 10 74 2F A1 EC 87 00 01 88 0D F0 87	... 離 . 離 ... *
00001C60	00 01 38 06 75 08 38 CE 0F 84 D9 02 00 00 8B 3D	... 離 . 離 ... *
00001C70	14 12 00 01 51 50 68 81 00 00 00 FF 35 D4 87 00	... QPh7 ... 5P ...
00001C80	01 E9 56 01 00 00 88 3D 14 12 00 01 68 F0 87 00	... 離 ... h ... *
00001C90	01 68 EC 87 00 01 68 80 00 00 00 FF 35 D4 87 00	... h * h ... 5P ...
00001CA0	01 FF D7 A1 EC 87 00 01 88 0D F0 87 00 01 38 C1	... 3 . 2 ... * ... 離
00001CB0	75 11 89 35 EC 87 00 01 89 35 F0 87 00 01 E9 84	... u . 5 * ... 5 * ... 離
00001CC0	02 00 00 51 50 59 07 01 00 00 88 CE 88 12 01 00	... QP ... 離 ... *
00001CD0	00 2B 08 0F 84 3C 02 00 00 83 E9 04 0F 84 29 02	... + < . < ... *
00001CE0	00 00 49 0F 84 F9 01 00 00 81 E9 1C 01 00 00 0F	... 1 . * ... *
00001CF0	84 E0 01 00 00 81 E9 E6 00 00 0F 84 3D 01 00	... * ... * ... *
00001D00	00 81 E9 E8 7C 00 00 0F 84 02 01 00 00 3B 35 5C	... * 離 ... 5P ...
00001D10	88 00 01 0F 85 EE 00 00 00 88 45 14 88 48 0C 88	... * ... 離 離 ... *
00001D20	C1 8B 01 F7 00 C1 EA 02 83 E0 01 83 E2 01 F6 C1	... 離 * 子 ... * ... *


WinnypRadar

- Connect to Winnyp network as one of the Winnyp node.
- Collects "Key information" from connected node by using Winnyp protocol.
- WinnypRadar can connect to both winny node and winnyp node.



Distinction between Winny node and Winnyp node

- There is a possibility including the Winny node in the Winnyp network, because Winnyp has compatibility with Winny.
- In WinnypRadar, the version of connected node is specified based on an initial packet of the connected node.






Collected information

- Collected key information includes file name and IP address.
- What kind of file which IP address has opened to the public can be investigated.

IP address
Port
File size
File time stamp
File name
Hash
...

Crawling

- IP address in the collected key information is used to the new connection destination.
- Connects at the new connection destination, and key information is acquired.





Result

- Proportion of Winnyp node in Winny network
 - Be judged whether connected node is Winnyp when WinnypRadar connects it, and records.
 - The ratio of Winnyp is calculated from the number of connected all nodes.
- Result of measurement during a day by using WinnypRadar

Node count	198,000 node (exclude Port0 setting)
Proportion of Winnyp node	8% (16,000 node)

※From analysis result by CROSSWARP, Inc

http://www.scat.or.jp/stnf/contents/p2p/p2p080910_4.pdf



Conclusion

- I analyzed the encryption key generation algorithm and packet processing of Winnyp v2.1b7.28
- In Winnyp, the encryption key generation algorithm is more complex than Winny.
- Develop Winnyp network crawler “WinnypRadar” based on the analytical result.
- The investigation concerning the Winnyp node that was not able to be detected up to now by the use of WinnypRadar became possible.



Further tasks

- This time, because an enough node investigation period was not able to be taken, it is necessary to investigate the node for the long term.
- It seems that a more accurate number of Winnyp nodes can be measured by investigating the node that connects it only with Winnyp though the Winnyp node that was able to be connected with the Winny network was investigated in this investigation.

Thank you!



Fourteenforty Research Institute, Inc.

<http://www.fourteenforty.jp>

Senior Software Engineer

Toshiaki Ishiyama

ishiyama@fourteenforty.jp