

# SEH overwrite and its exploitability

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# Agenda

- Theme and Goal
- Review of SEH overwrites
- Protection mechanisms for SEH overwrites
- Bypassing protection mechanisms.
- Demonstration
- Conclusion

# Theme and goal

## Theme

- SEH overwriting is one of the major methods for exploiting Windows software.
- We already have several protection mechanisms for SEH overwrites.
- Is the protection provided by DEP and SEHOP enough?
- How about the protection from SafeSEH and SEHOP?

## Goal

- To reveal which combinations of the known protection mechanisms for SEH overwrites are really effective.
- On the way to the goal, I will show you that we can bypass SafeSEH and Software DEP and Hardware DEP and SEHOP, all at the same time, under certain conditions.

# Target environment

- Windows XP SP3
- Windows Vista SP1
- Windows 7
  
- 32bit processes on x86
- 32bit processes on x64 (WOW64)
  
- Visual Studio 2008 was used to compile all the programs in this presentation.

# Review of SEH Overwrite


# About SEH

- SEH is “Structured Exception Handling”
- Exception handling system provided by Windows

```
int test(void){
    __try{
        // Exception may occur here
    }
    __except( EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER ){
        // This handles the exception
    }


    return 0;
}
```

# Inside Windows Exception Dispatching




```
typedef struct _EXCEPTION_RECORD{  
    struct _EXCEPTION_RECORD *_next;  
    PEXCEPTION_ROUTINE _handler;  
} EXCEPTION_RECORD;
```

# SEH Overwrite Attack





# Stack after an exception handler is called



# Protection mechanisms

# Protection mechanisms

- /GS
- SafeSEH
- SoftwareDEP
- SEHOP
- Hardware DEP
- ASLR

# /GS


- Stack Guard by Visual Studio compiler
- This checks if a buffer overflow occurs before returning from a function.
- This is irrelevant to SEH overwrites because an exception can be generated before the check.

# Protection mechanisms


SEH overwrites specific

# SafeSEH


A module protected by SafeSEH



# Weakness of SafeSEH



# Modules not protected by SafeSEH



OllyDbg - thunderbird.exe - [/SafeSEH Module Scanner]

File View Debug Plugins Options Window Help

LEMTWHC / KBR... S

SEH mode	Base	Limit	Module version	Module Name
/SafeSEH ON	0x7d5b0000	0x7ddb0000	6.00.2900.5622 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.08	C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHELL32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x7c940000	0x7c9df000	5.1.2600.5755 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x7c800000	0x7c933000	5.1.2600.5781 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77fa0000	0x77fb1000	5.1.2600.5834 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77f20000	0x77f96000	6.00.2900.5512 (xpsp.080413-210	C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHLWAPI.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77ed0000	0x77f19000	5.1.2600.5698 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.081	C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77e30000	0x77ec2000	5.1.2600.5795 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77d80000	0x77e29000	5.1.2600.5755 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77cf0000	0x77d80000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2105	C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77bc0000	0x77c18000	7.0.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2111	C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcr7.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77bb0000	0x77bb8000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2105	C:\WINDOWS\system32\VERSION.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77160000	0x77263000	6.0 (xpsp.080413-2105)	C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls_6595t
/SafeSEH ON	0x770d0000	0x7715b000	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x76af0000	0x76b1b000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0845	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll
No SEH	0x60740000	0x60749000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2105	C:\WINDOWS\system32\LPK.DLL
/SafeSEH ON	0x719d0000	0x719d8000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0852	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x719e0000	0x719f7000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0852	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2_32.dll
No SEH	0x71a00000	0x71a0b000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0852	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WSOCK32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x72f50000	0x72f76000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0852	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINSPOOL.DRV
No SEH	0x73f80000	0x73feb000	1.0420.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2	C:\WINDOWS\system32\USP10.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x762e0000	0x762fd000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2105	C:\WINDOWS\system32\IMM32.DLL
/SafeSEH ON	0x76300000	0x76348000	6.00.2900.5512 (xpsp.080413-210	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmdlg32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x76970000	0x76aad000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2108	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60460000	0x604c9000	1.8.1.23: 2009081210	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\xpcom_core.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60440000	0x60454000	1.8.1.23: 2009081210	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\xpcom_compat.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60400000	0x60423000	3.12.3.1 Basic ECC	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\ssl3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x603c0000	0x603f6000	1.8.1.23: 2009081210	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\sqlite3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60370000	0x6038a000	3.12.3.1 Basic ECC	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\smime3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60360000	0x60366000	4.7.1	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\plds4.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60350000	0x60357000	4.7.1	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\plc4.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60330000	0x60344000	3.12.3.1	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\nssutil3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x601f0000	0x602aa000	3.12.3.1 Basic ECC	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\nss3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x601c0000	0x601e8000	4.7.1	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\nspr4.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x601b0000	0x601b6000		C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\NSLDAPPR32V50.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60180000	0x601a3000		C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\NSLDAP32V50.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x600e0000	0x60152000	4.0	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\js3250.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x400000	0xc04000	1.8.1.23: 2009081210	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\thunderbird.exe

Analysing thunderbird: 26567 heuristical procedures, 5830 calls to known, 12747 calls to guessed functions

Paused

From Thunderbird 2.0.0.23

\* All modules in Thunderbird 3.0.3 are compiled with /SafeSEH



# pop pop ret in the wild

OllyDbg - thunderbird.exe - [CPU - thread 00000890, module thunderb]

File View Debug Plugins Options Window Help

Registers (FPU)

EAX	7FFDF000
ECX	00000002
EDX	00000003
EBX	00000001
ESP	03D3FFCC
EBP	03D3FFF4
ESI	00000004
EDI	00000005
EIP	7C94120F ntdll.7C94
C 0	ES 0023 32bit 0(FF)
P 1	CS 001B 32bit 0(FF)
A 0	SS 0023 32bit 0(FF)
Z 1	DS 0023 32bit 0(FF)
S 0	FS 0038 32bit 7FFA
T 0	GS 0000 NULL
D 0	
O 0	LastErr ERROR_SUCC
EFL	00000246 (NO,NB,E,B)
ST0	empty +UNORM 0A0A 30
ST1	empty +UNORM 6570 20
ST2	empty +UNORM 6C62 60
ST3	empty +UNORM 6948 60
ST4	empty +UNORM 7563 60
ST5	empty +UNORM 5FC8 70
ST6	empty +UNORM 3278 00
ST7	empty -UNORM ED50 00
	3 2 1 0
FST	0000 Cond 0 0 0 0
FCW	027F Prec NEAR,53


```
00401A60 8BF8 MOV EDI,EAX
00401A62 33F6 XOR ESI,ESI
00401A64 3BFE CMP EDI,ESI
00401A66 59 POP ECX
00401A67 75 04 JNZ SHORT thunderb.00401A6D
00401A69 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX
00401A6B EB 21 JMP SHORT thunderb.00401A8E
00401A6D 3975 08 CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8],ESI
00401A70 8BC7 MOV EAX,EDI
00401A72 7E 15 JLE SHORT thunderb.00401A89
00401A74 FF34B3 PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+ESI*4]
00401A77 50 PUSH EAX
00401A78 E8 2E000000 CALL thunderb.00401AAB
00401A7D C600 20 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],20
00401A80 40 INC EAX
00401A81 46 INC ESI
00401A82 59 POP ECX
00401A83 3B75 08 CMP ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00401A86 59 POP ECX
00401A87 7C EB JL SHORT thunderb.00401A74
00401A89 8020 00 AND BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],0
00401A8C 8BC7 MOV EAX,EDI
00401A8E 5F POP EDI
00401A8F 5E POP ESI
00401A90 5B POP EBX
00401A91 5D POP EBP
00401A92 C3 RETN
00401A93 8B5424 04 MOV EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]
00401A97 6A 02 PUSH 2
00401A99 58 POP EAX
00401A9A EB 08 JMP SHORT thunderb.00401AA4
00401A9C 80F9 22 CMP CL,22
00401A9F 75 01 JNZ SHORT thunderb.00401AA2
00401AA1 40 INC EAX
00401AA2 40 INC EAX
00401AA3 42 INC EDX
00401AA4 8A0A MOV CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX]
00401AA6 84C9 TEST CL,CL
00401AA8 75 F2 JNZ SHORT thunderb.00401A9C
00401AAA C3 RETN
00401AAB 8B4424 04 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]
00401AAC 8B5424 04 MOV EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]
```

Attached process paused at ntdll.DbgBreakPoint

Paused

From thunderbird.exe

# Additional check by Software DEP



# Software DEP

KPROCESS structure



```
0: kd> dt nt!_KEXECUTE_OPTIONS
+0x000 ExecuteDisable : Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x000 ExecuteEnable : Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x000 DisableThunkEmulation : Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x000 Permanent : Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x000 ExecuteDispatchEnable : Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x000 ImageDispatchEnable : Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x000 DisableExceptionChainValidation : Pos 6, 1 Bit
+0x000 Spare : Pos 7, 1 Bit
```


# Software DEP

Module  
SafeSEH Protected

Module  
Not SafeSEH Protected


Data area  
without executable attribute

Data area  
with executable attribute



# SEHOP

SEH overwrites protection



# Protection mechanisms

Generic protections



# Hardware DEP and ASLR

- Hardware DEP prevents code without executable attribute from being executed.
- ASLR has several impacts on the SEH overwrites.( Explain later )

# Bypassing protection mechanisms



# SafeSEH and Software DEP



Module SafeSEH Protected


Module Not SafeSEH Protected

Non module area (Data area)

Non module area with executable attribute


# Bypassing SEHOP

- It is weak if the address of a buffer overflow and FinalExceptionHandler is known.
- Attackers can recreate a proper SEH chain.



# Bypassing Hardware DEP


- Return-into-libc
- Return-oriented programming



# Bypass /GS, SafeSEH, Software DEP, Hardware DEP, SEHOP


- Recreate SEH Chain (bypassing SEHOP)
- Overwritten exception handler address must be in a module which is not SafeSEH enabled ( bypassing SafeSEH )
- Create a stack to execute desired code ( bypassing Hardware DEP )
- To execute the code using the stack above, we have to set an exception handler to some stack rewind and return instructions ( bypassing Hardware DEP )
- Trigger an exception

# Recreating the SEH Chain and Setting the Exception Handler Address




# Good instruction to bypass Hardware


## DEP



# Create proper stack for return-into-libc



# Exception handlers which can be used





# Example of “add esp + retn”

The screenshot shows the OllyDbg interface for the process 'thunderbird.exe' at the module 'NSLDAP32'. The assembly window displays the following code:

```
6018B4D0 83FE FF    CMP     ESI, -1
6018B4D3 74 1A     JE     SHORT NSLDAP32.6018B4EF
6018B4D5 E8 06D60000 CALL  NSLDAP32.60198AE0
6018B4DA 3D 33270000 CMP     EAX, 2733
6018B4DF 74 0E     JE     SHORT NSLDAP32.6018B4EF
6018B4E1 5F       POP     EDI
6018B4E2 5E       POP     ESI
6018B4E3 5D       POP     EBP
6018B4E4 83C8 FF    OR     EBX, EFFFFFFF
6018B4E7 5B       POP     EBX
6018B4E8 81C4 240C0000 ADD    ESP, 0C24
6018B4EE C3       RETN
6018B4EF 3BF5     SC     EBX, 018B63A
6018B4F1 0F84 43010000 SC     EBX, 018B63A
6018B4F7 897C24 28 MOV    DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+28], EDI
6018B4FB B9 01010000 MOV    ECX, 101
6018B500 8D7424 28 LEA   ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+28]
6018B504 8DB024 2C040000 LEA   EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+42C]
6018B50B 895C24 2C MOV    DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+2C], EBX
6018B50F F3:A5    REP    MOVS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI], DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
6018B511 B9 01010000 MOV    ECX, 101
6018B516 8D7424 28 LEA   ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+28]
6018B51A 8DB024 30080000 LEA   EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+830]
6018B521 F3:A5    REP    MOVS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI], DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
6018B523 8B8C24 440C0000 MOV    ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C44]
6018B52A 3BCD    CMP    ECX, EBP
6018B52C 7D 0C    JGE    SHORT NSLDAP32.6018B53A
6018B52E 83F9 FF    CMP    ECX, -1
6018B531 74 05     JE     SHORT NSLDAP32.6018B538
6018B533 83C9 FF    OR     ECX, FFFFFFFF
6018B536 EB 23     JMP    SHORT NSLDAP32.6018B55B
6018B538 3BCD    CMP    ECX, EBP
6018B53A 74 17     JE     SHORT NSLDAP32.6018B553
6018B53C B8 D34D6210 MOV    EAX, 10624D03
6018B541 FZF9    IMUL  ECX
```

The registers window on the right shows the following values:

EAX	00000000
ECX	0012FFC4
EDX	7C94E514
EBX	7FFDF000
ESP	0012FFC4
EBP	0012FFFF
ESI	FFFFFFFF
EDI	7C950228
EIP	00A12576

The status bar at the bottom shows the module path: 'Module C:\PROGRAM~1\Google\GOOGLE~1\GOEC62~1.DLL' and the state 'Paused'.

From Thunderbird 2.0.0.23

# Summarize the condition

- The address of the stack where buffer overflow occurs is known.
- The address of the FinalExceptionHandler in ntdll.dll is known.
- A process has a module not protected by /SafeSEH
- “add esp + retn” instructions which matches followings can be found in the module.
  - The amount of “add esp” rewind is larger than the stack made by windows exception dispatcher.
  - The amount of “add esp” rewind is smaller than the stack size when the exception handler is called.
- The address of VirtualAlloc and memcpy is known ( or some alternatives can be used).
- Attacker can write 0x00 on the stack by using buffer overflow, which means string functions can't be used to exploit. ( At least the method I showed here can not be used if this doesn't match)

# Demonstration

- Demonstration on Windows 7
- I assumed that “add esp,0x0c24 – retn” can be found in a non /SafeSEH protected module.
- /GS, Software DEP , Hardware DEP, SEHOP are all enabled.
- ASLR is disabled.

# Importance of ASLR

- Makes it difficult to recreate proper SEH chain
- Makes it difficult to find “add esp + retn” instructions at a fixed address.
- Makes it difficult to set FinalExceptionHandler address in the last element of SEH chain.

# Conclusion

Protections	Windows XP SP3	Windows Vista SP1	Windows 7
/GS + SafeSEH	Exploitable by using data area as an exception handler	Exploitable by using data area as an exception handler	Exploitable by using data area as an exception handler
/GS + SafeSEH + Software DEP	If all modules are SafeSEH protected its difficult to exploit	If all modules are SafeSEH protected its difficult to exploit	If all modules are SafeSEH protected its difficult to exploit
/GS + Software DEP + Hardware DEP	Exploitable by Return-into-libc or Return-oriented programming	Exploitable by Return-into-libc or Return-oriented programming	Exploitable by Return-into-libc or Return-oriented programming
/GS + Software DEP + SEHOP	-	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH chain	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH chain
/GS + SafeSEH + SEHOP	-	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH chain and using data area as an exception handler	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH chain and using data area as an exception handler
/GS + Software DEP + SEHOP + Hardware DEP	-	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH Chain and using data area and return-oriented programming	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH Chain and using data area and return-oriented programming
/GS + SEHOP + ASLR	-	Difficult to exploit	Difficult to exploit
/GS + Software DEP + SEHOP + Hardware DEP + ASLR	-	Difficult to exploit	Difficult to exploit

# ASLR + DEP

- “Bypassing Browser Memory Protections”  
( Alexander Sotirov, Mark Dowd ) shows how to bypass them.
- But it was without SEHOP

Questions?