



Monthly Research  
**Latest Security Reports of Automobile and  
Vulnerability Assessment by CVSS v3**

**FFRI, Inc.**  
<http://www.ffri.jp>

## Background

- Automobile security is hot topic in many conferences.
- Cyber security measures are essential for the automobile.
- We summarize the following topics based on the above background.
  - Presentations at the conferences other than Black Hat USA 2015 and DEF CON 23.
  - Introduction of vulnerability assessment methods of automobile security by CVSS v3.

# Agenda

- 24<sup>th</sup> USENIX Security Symposium Survey
- escar Asia 2015 Survey
- CVSS v3 Overview
- Vulnerability assessment example by CVSS v3
- Conclusions



# 24<sup>th</sup> USENIX Security Symposium

## Dismantling Megamos Crypto: Wirelessly Lockpicking a Vehicle Immobilizer

- Presentation to demonstrate the attack (decipher) for encryption that is used to immobilizer.
- The researchers pointed out two problems (the attack techniques)
  - Partial Key-update Attack
    - Lock bit is not set. (writable)
    - Unlock possible in the default PIN.
    - In addition to the above, it is possible to perform decryption of the cipher in verifying the key bits for each block of 16bits.
  - Weak key attack
    - The secret key that is used in some vehicles was possible to search in a few seconds.

## Dismantling Megamos Crypto: Wirelessly Lockpicking a Vehicle Immobilizer (cont.)

- Although this report was to be published in two years ago originally, it has become impossible to publish for injunction was issued by the court.
- Our comments
  - Among the researchers pointed out problems:
    - “Partial Key-update Attack” possible measures by the user.
    - “Weak key attack” measures by experts, such as dealers.
  - When using the encryption, it should also be sufficiently considered the generation and management of (secret) keys.

## Fast and Vulnerable: A Story of Telematic Failures

- Vulnerability report of telematics device using OBD-II port.
- Multiple vulnerabilities have been pointed out.
  - CVE-2015-2906, CVE-2015-2907, CVE-2015-2908
- The following issues have been pointed out:
  - The devices it is possible access to the debug console (e.g. Web UI, Telnet) via USB, but there is no authentication.
  - Weak password has been found in the “/etc/shadow”.
    - this also allows access by SSH
  - Possible to send arbitrary CAN messages.

## Fast and Vulnerable: A Story of Telematic Failures (cont.)

- Each network services have been bound to all network interfaces.
  - Therefore, some of the attacks might be possible to be carried out over the Internet.
- The device can execute the following commands via SMS.
  - Status, GPS, Reset, Update
- Update process is performed without authentication, not be encrypted.
  - As a result, it is possible to execute any command by exploiting the update process.



## Fast and Vulnerable: A Story of Telematic Failures (cont.)

- Our comments
  - Cases of threats that have been pointed out in the “Attacking and Defending Autos Via OBD-II” later became a reality.
  - In the report, researchers are searching for vulnerable devices using SHODAN (<http://www.shodanhq.com/>)
    - Attackers also are likely to do the same.
  - Cyber security measures of the vehicle is not only OEM and suppliers, should be considered also in the product side of using an interface such as OBD-II.



# escar Asia 2015

## Attacking and Defending Autos Via OBD-II


- Lecture about vulnerability and threats of OBD-II devices that insurance company had provided.
- In the lecture following problems have been pointed out:
  - Data to be sent to the server is not encrypted.
  - It does not have the update function, vulnerability of measures impossible.
  - There is a risk to be sent to any of the CAN message by attack.
  - If the server is attacked, the possibility that there is an impact on all vehicles that use the service.

# Attacking and Defending Autos Via OBD-II (cont.)

OBD-II for the adapter there is a product that corresponds to the various interfaces such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi in addition to SIM

If the back-end (server) is attacked, which can affect all vehicles that are serviced.

The protocol specification, can be injected any message on the CAN bus with or without malice.



## Attacking and Defending Autos Via OBD-II (cont.)

- Our comments
  - Recently, devices using the OBD-II has been around for many, these usage should be recognized that there is a possibility that any of the CAN message is injected.
  - In the case of cloud services, security of server-side also should be considered sufficient.



# CVSS v3

## Overview

- CVSS v3 is a method to evaluate vulnerability of component units.
  - For more information refer to the following URL.
  - <https://www.first.org/cvss>
- In CVSS v3, impact assessment and attack difficulty evaluation by the attack are separated.
  - Furthermore, the assessment of the impact “extent of influence (scope)” is taken into account.
  - CVSS v3 to risk assessment in the component unit is considered to be effective in the information security analysis for automotive.
- As a risk assessment of the vulnerabilities reported by USENIX, we calculate each of the base score of CVSS v3 and v2.

# The risk assessment example by CVSS v3

- (1) Dismantling Megamos Crypto: Wirelessly Lockpicking a Vehicle Immobilizer
- (2) Fast and Vulnerable: A Story of Telematic Failures  
(Same as CVE-2015-2906, 2907 and 2908)

評価項目	(1)		(2)	
	CVSS v3	CVSS v2	CVSS v3	CVSS v2
AV : Access/Attack Vector	<b>Adjacent</b>	Adjacent	<b>Network</b>	Network
AC : Access/Attack Complexity	<b>High</b>	High	<b>Low</b>	Low
Au : Authentication	—	None	—	Single
PR : Privileges Required	<b>None</b>	—	<b>Low</b>	—
UI : User Interaction	<b>Required</b>	—	<b>None</b>	—
S : Scope	<b>Unchanged</b>	—	<b>Unchanged</b>	—
C : Confidentiality Impact	<b>High</b>	Complete	<b>High</b>	Complete
I : Integrity Impact	<b>None</b>	None	<b>High</b>	Complete
A : Availability Impact	<b>High</b>	Complete	<b>High</b>	Complete
<b>Base Score</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>9.0</b>



## Conclusions

- Devices that directly connect to the CAN bus also should consider security measures enough.
- To consider the risk of wireless sniffing. (Similar to wired)
- Considerations of encryption
  - Method of generating a secret key.
  - Generate key management, protection method.
- CVSS v3 is effective possibilities even on to examine the information security analysis and measure of automotive from the fact that can vulnerability assessment in the component units.

## References

- Dismantling Megamos Crypto: Wirelessly Lockpicking a Vehicle Immobilizer
  - <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/verdult>
- Fast and Vulnerable: A Story of Telematics Failures
  - <https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot15/workshop-program/presentation/foster>
- Vulnerability Note VU#209512  
Mobile Devices C4 OBD2 dongle contains multiple vulnerabilities
  - <https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/209512>
- Welcome to escar Asia The leading automotive Cyber Security conference
  - [http://techon.nikkeibp.co.jp/seminar/escar\\_e/](http://techon.nikkeibp.co.jp/seminar/escar_e/)
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System v3.0: Specification Document
  - <https://www.first.org/cvss/specification-document>
- CVSS Calculator >> English Version
  - <http://jvndb.jvn.jp/cvss/en.html>
- CVSS v3 Calculator >> English Version
  - <http://jvndb.jvn.jp/cvss/v3/en.html>