SEH overwrite and its exploitability

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Agenda

- Theme and Goal
- Review of SEH overwrites
- Protection mechanisms for SEH overwrites
- Bypassing protection mechanisms.
- Demonstration
- Conclusion

Theme and goal

Theme

- SEH overwriting is one of the major methods for exploiting Windows software.
- We already have several protection mechanisms for SEH overwrites.
- Is the protection provided by DEP and SEHOP enough?
- How about the protection from SafeSEH and SEHOP?

Goal

- To reveal which combinations of the known protection mechanisms for SEH overwrites are really effective.
- On the way to the goal, I will show you that we can bypass SafeSEH and Software DEP and Hardware DEP and SEHOP, all at the same time, under certain conditions.

Target environment

- Windows XP SP3
- Windows Vista SP1
- Windows 7

- 32bit processes on x86
- 32bit processes on x64 (WOW64)

- Visual Studio 2008 was used to compile all the programs in this presentation.

Review of SEH Overwrite

About SEH

- SEH is “Structured Exception Handling”
- Exception handling system provided by Windows

```
int test(void){
__try{
   // Exception may occur here
}
__except( EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER ){
   // This handles the exception
}

return 0;
}
```

Inside Windows Exception Dispatching




```
typedef struct _EXCEPTION_RECORD{
    struct _EXCEPTION_RECORD *_next;
    PEXCEPTION_ROUTINE _handler;
} EXCEPTION_RECORD;
```

SEH Overwrite Attack



Stack after an exception handler is called



Protection mechanisms

Protection mechanisms

- /GS
- SafeSEH
- SoftwareDEP
- SEHOP
- Hardware DEP
- ASLR

/GS

- Stack Guard by Visual Studio compiler
- This checks if a buffer overflow occurs before returning from a function.
- This is irrelevant to SEH overwrites because an exception can be generated before the check.

Protection mechanisms

SEH overwrites specific

SafeSEH


A module protected by SafeSEH
Header
Handler1
0x00002550
Handler2
0x00049080
Handler3
...
...
...
Code
"pop,pop,ret" sequence
0x00002550
Handler1
0x00049080
Handler2

Weakness of SafeSEH



Modules not protected by SafeSEH



SEH mode	Base	Limit	Module version	Module Name
/SafeSEH ON	0x7d5b0000	0x7ddb0000	6.00.2900.5622 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.08	C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHELL32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x7c940000	0x7c9df000	5.1.2600.5755 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x7c800000	0x7c933000	5.1.2600.5781 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77fa0000	0x77fb1000	5.1.2600.5834 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77f20000	0x77f96000	6.00.2900.5512 (xpsp.080413-210	C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHLWAPI.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77ed0000	0x77f19000	5.1.2600.5698 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.081	C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77e30000	0x77ec2000	5.1.2600.5795 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77d80000	0x77e29000	5.1.2600.5755 (xpsp_sp3_gdr.090	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77cf0000	0x77d80000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2105	C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77bc0000	0x77c18000	7.0.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2111	C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77bb0000	0x77bb8000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2105	C:\WINDOWS\system32\VERSION.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x77160000	0x77263000	6.0 (xpsp.080413-2105)	C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls_6595b
/SafeSEH ON	0x770d0000	0x7715b000	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x76af0000	0x76b1b000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0845	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll
No SEH	0x60740000	0x60749000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2105	C:\WINDOWS\system32\LPK.DLL
/SafeSEH ON	0x719d0000	0x719d8000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0852	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x719e0000	0x719f7000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0852	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2_32.dll
No SEH	0x71a00000	0x71a0b000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0852	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WSOCK32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x72f50000	0x72f76000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-0852	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINSPOOL.DRV
No SEH	0x73f80000	0x73feb000	1.0420.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2	C:\WINDOWS\system32\USP10.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x762e0000	0x762fd000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2105	C:\WINDOWS\system32\IMM32.DLL
/SafeSEH ON	0x76300000	0x76348000	6.00.2900.5512 (xpsp.080413-210	C:\WINDOWS\system32\comdlg32.dll
/SafeSEH ON	0x76970000	0x76aad000	5.1.2600.5512 (xpsp.080413-2108	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60460000	0x604c9000	1.8.1.23: 2009081210	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\xpcom_core.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60440000	0x60454000	1.8.1.23: 2009081210	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\xpcom_compat.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60400000	0x60423000	3.12.3.1 Basic ECC	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\ssl3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x603c0000	0x603f6000	1.8.1.23: 2009081210	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\sqlite3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60370000	0x6038a000	3.12.3.1 Basic ECC	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\smime3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60360000	0x60366000	4.7.1	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\plds4.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60350000	0x60357000	4.7.1	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\plc4.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60330000	0x60344000	3.12.3.1	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\nssutil3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x601f0000	0x602aa000	3.12.3.1 Basic ECC	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\nss3.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x601c0000	0x601e8000	4.7.1	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\nspr4.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x601b0000	0x601b6000		C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\NSLDAPPR32V50.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x60180000	0x601a3000		C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\NSLDAP32V50.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x600e0000	0x60152000	4.0	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\js3250.dll
/SafeSEH OFF	0x400000	0xc04000	1.8.1.23: 2009081210	C:\Program Files\Mozilla Thunderbird\thunderbird.exe

From Thunderbird 2.0.0.23

* All modules in Thunderbird 3.0.3 are compiled with /SafeSEH

pop pop ret in the wild



From thunderbird.exe

Additional check by Software DEP



Software DEP

KPROCESS structure



Software DEP



SEHOP

SEH overwrites protection



Protection mechanisms

Generic protections

Hardware DEP and ASLR

- Hardware DEP prevents code without executable attribute from being executed.
- ASLR has several impacts on the SEH overwrites.(Explain later)

Bypassing protection mechanisms

SafeSEH and Software DEP



Bypassing SEHOP

- It is weak if the address of a buffer overflow and FinalExceptionHandler is known.
- Attackers can recreate a proper SEH chain.



Bypassing Hardware DEP

- Return-into-libc
- Return-oriented programming



Bypass /GS, SafeSEH, Software DEP, Hardware DEP, SEHOP

- Recreate SEH Chain (bypassing SEHOP)
- Overwritten exception handler address must be in a module which is not SafeSEH enabled (bypassing SafeSEH)
- Create a stack to execute desired code (bypassing Hardware DEP)
- To execute the code using the stack above, we have to set an exception handler to some stack rewind and return instructions (bypassing Hardware DEP)
- Trigger an exception

Recreating the SEH Chain and Setting the Exception Handler Address



Good instruction to bypass Hardware DEP



Create proper stack for return-into-libc



Exception handlers which can be used



Example of “add esp + retn”



From Thunderbird 2.0.0.23

Summarize the condition

- The address of the stack where buffer overflow occurs is known.
- The address of the FinalExceptionHandler in ntdll.dll is known.
- A process has a module not protected by /SafeSEH
- “add esp + retn” instructions which matches followings can be found in the module.
  - The amount of “add esp” rewind is larger than the stack made by windows exception dispatcher.
  - The amount of “add esp” rewind is smaller than the stack size when the exception handler is called.
- The address of VirtualAlloc and memcpy is known (or some alternatives can be used).
- Attacker can write 0x00 on the stack by using buffer overflow, which means string functions can’t be used to exploit. (At least the method I showed here can not be used if this doesn’t match)

Demonstration

- Demonstration on Windows 7
- I assumed that “add esp,0x0c24 – retn” can be found in a non /SafeSEH protected module.
- /GS, Software DEP , Hardware DEP, SEHOP are all enabled.
- ASLR is disabled.

Importance of ASLR

- Makes it difficult to recreate proper SEH chain
- Makes it difficult to find “add esp + retn” instructions at a fixed address.
- Makes it difficult to set FinalExceptionHandler address in the last element of SEH chain.

Conclusion

Protections	Windows XP SP3	Windows Vista SP1	Windows 7
/GS + SafeSEH	Exploitable by using data area as an exception handler	Exploitable by using data area as an exception handler	Exploitable by using data area as an exception handler
/GS + SafeSEH + Software DEP	If all modules are SafeSEH protected its difficult to exploit	If all modules are SafeSEH protected its difficult to exploit	If all modules are SafeSEH protected its difficult to exploit
/GS + Software DEP + Hardware DEP	Exploitable by Return-into-libc or Return-oriented programming	Exploitable by Return-into-libc or Return-oriented programming	Exploitable by Return-into-libc or Return-oriented programming
/GS + Software DEP + SEHOP	-	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH chain	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH chain
/GS + SafeSEH + SEHOP	-	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH chain and using data area as an exception handler	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH chain and using data area as an exception handler
/GS + Software DEP + SEHOP + Hardware DEP	-	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH Chain and using data area and return-oriented programming	Exploitable by recreating proper SEH Chain and using data area and return-oriented programming
/GS + SEHOP + ASLR	-	Difficult to exploit	Difficult to exploit
/GS + Software DEP + SEHOP + Hardware DEP + ASLR	-	Difficult to exploit	Difficult to exploit

ASLR + DEP

- “Bypassing Browser Memory Protections” (Alexander Sotirov, Mark Dowd) shows how to bypass them.
- But it was without SEHOP

Questions?